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Perkins: Crossing the Melfa River

Crossing the Melfa River
Lieutenant Edward J. Perkins, DSO
he recce troop of an armoured regiment
consists of eleven light American General
Stuart or "Honey" tanks. From these the
turrets have been removed and instead a . 50
Browning machine gun is mounted. The vehicle
carries a crew of five and its fire power besides
the .50 includes a .30 Browning, a Bren gun, a
PlAT and fourTornrnies. We also carry prepared
charges and grenades. In small arms weapons,
our fire power per man is a as large as any force
in the army. Our job is close recce both of the
ground and ofthe enemy which we are prepared
to do either from our vehicles or on foot.

T

For the Melfa crossing, six of my tanks were
taken for use by engineers who were travelling
with us and my troop consisted of only five
tanks. As a matter of fact, my own tank had a
mechanical failure soon after we crossed the
start line and I had to switch to my sergeant's
tank. At no time during the operation did the
troop consist of more than four tanks carrying
in all twenty men.
The plan of the operation was that a force
commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Vokes of
the British Columbia Dragoons (BCD) and
including the Irish Regiment of Canada, was to
push through the gap in the Adolf Hitler Line
which had been made by 1st Canadian Division.
They were to advance about 8000 yards and
then form a strong point or "firm base." My
regiment was to go through this strong point
and advance the remaining 4000 yards to the
Melfa. We were then to seize a crossing and to
hold it while other troops passed over and
continued the advance. My job was to lead the
regiment during the advance to get to the river
as quickly as possible, find a crossing and get
over. The Commanding Officer (CO) would

then push over "A" Company of the motor
battalion who were under his command, and if
possible, get a tank squadron over, although
whether this last would be possible, was not
certain.
The Vokes force pushed over the start line
at 0600 hours. At 0800 hours, the CO sent me
forward to liaise with them and to find out what
was happening. I found that while the preceding
units were not encountering great opposition
from the enemy, they were having considerable
difficulty in getting their tanks forward over
many obstacles and the rate of advance was
consequently slow. I spent most ofthe morning
reporting progress to my CO who was
impatiently waiting in the assembly area two or
three thousand yards back.
At about 1130 hours, we got orders to move
forward. Progress was still very slow both
because ofthe many defiles and the congestion
on the road. We started to pass through the
BCD tanks, many of which were firing, but at
what I could not see. Eventually at about 1340
hours, we were clear of them and on our own.
I headed straight up the centre line. The
country was close and visibility limited. It was
not very easy to map-read, but I had a good set
of air photographs and never had any trouble
in keeping track of my position. The first
enemy I saw was about a thousand yards from
the BCD. A half-track was parked behind a
house with its crew around it. My troop opened
fire on the crew who tried to run for it. Five
were hit and two apparently managed to get
away. About 2000 yards further on, a Panther
tank suddenly carne across my right front
travelling very quickly at a range of about 300
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yards. The crew commander was standing in
the turret with most of his chest exposed. I
immediately opened up on him with my .50
Browning and had the satisfaction of seeing
him slump forward out of his cupola. The
Panther made no effort to retaliate and I kept
going forward as fast as I could. A little further
on I saw two more tanks to the left. I heard "A"
Squadron getting ready for them over the
wireless and so I kept going. Apparently they
did not see me for they did not fire. As we came
close to the river bank, I saw a house in which
there was movement. We immediately opened
up on it. A few seconds later, a white flag
appeared at the end of the windows to be
followed when our fire ceased by eight Germans
with their hands up. I could not be bothered by
prisoners, so I waited a few seconds until a
carrier from a scout platoon of the motor
battalion which was working with "A" Squadron
came up. I turned the prisoners over to the
carrier's crew then pushed on to the river
bank. We reached it at about 1500 hours.
When we were planning the operation, the
CO and I studied the ground by means of air
photographs. We found at least two possible
crossings, and of these, we deliberately chose
the most difficult for the initial crossing, since
it was far less likely to be defended. The plan
was that "C" Squadron on the left would later
try the other crossing, but before this part of
the plot could be put into effect, they became
involved in a major tank battle. It turned out
that the best crossing was effectively covered
by many anti-tank weapons, but the one we
had chosen was virtually undefended.
By this time, one of my tanks had become
lost in the difficult country and there were only
three left. I parked them under cover and
dismounted with Sergeant Macey to carry out
a recce of the Grossing. We posted three men
with Bren guns to cover us and began our
search. Towards the left, the bank was
impassable, but about 75 yards to the right,
there was a sort of ledge leading down into the
river bed. This was very steep and difficult, but
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still passable to tanks. All along the river bank,
were well prepared enemy positions which we
searched as we went along. The enemy had
obviously vacated them in great haste as there
was kit equipment lying about in profusion.
Sergeant Macey and I climbed down into the
stream-bed and up the far bank. As we did so,
we came under Spandau fire from the right and
one of the Bren gunners was shot in the
shoulder. This was the only casualty of the
whole operation. Sergeant Macey and I got
across safely and into cover on the far side. At
this point, we came under co-ax fire from an
"A" Squadron tank as "A" Squadron had now
come up to the river bank to support us.
The track on the far side was even more
difficult than that on the near side. I decided,
however, that it could be made passable, though
hard work would be necessary. I remained on
the far bank to guide the tanks up it while
Sergeant Macey returned to guide them down
the near bank. The crossing was successfully
completed one tank at a time, but getting up
the far bank required a certain amount of field
engineering. I sent two men with Bren guns up
on the top of the bank to cover us while the
remaining thirteen went to work. There was an
obstructing bank upon which we exploded
three prepared charges. It was also necessary
to widen the crack in one place, and to do this
we built a sort of retaining wall using several
tree trunks and then filled up the gap with dirt.
We did some furious work with pick and shovel,
which if not the soldier's favourite weapons,
are among his most useful. In retrospect I
think this was the most ticklish part of the
whole business. While we were not actually
under fire, we knew that the enemy must have
an idea of what we were up to and might be
expected to do something at any time.
Everything depended on speed - in an
amazingly short time the job was finished.
We got the tanks up the track and into a
hull down position below the bank. About a
hundred yards to my left was a house showing
signs of enemy occupation. I decided that our
next task must be to capture it. Myself, Sergeant
Macey and three men carrying two tommies
and a Bren gun, crept along under cover of the
bank and approached the house from its back
door. As I rushed through the court-yard and

into the house, I saw eight paratroopers staring
through the window and loopholes in the
direction of the other crossing, the one which
we had decided not to use. I shouted to "dropit," and they turned around in considerable
astonishment. They were big, well-built men
armed to the teeth and for a moment, I didn't
know what was going to happen. My trigger
finger itched, but I did not open fire. Suddenly,
one dropped his rifle to be followed instantly by
all the others and their hands rose in sullen
astonishment. There was one officer, one NCO
and six other ranks. A search of the house
revealed no more. Obviously they had expected
us to attack the main crossing and were
unprepared for this unexpected development.
I immediately organized the position for
defence. The three tanks were brought into a
hull-down position on the right of the house
and we dismounted some of the smaller
weapons for all-round defence. I sent one man
back with the prisoners and also Sergeant
Macey to guide "A" Squadron across. The
remaining thirteen of us were painfully few for
the task at hand. All of this had taken about
30 minutes from the time we first reached the
river bank.
The enemy had seen us taking the prisoners
out and was now turning his attention to us. A
sniper in a tree about 150 yards away opened
up, and although he was an astonishingly poor
shot, he was nevertheless very annoying. I
fired two shots at him from a PlAT and the
second one exploded in the branches. His rifle
fell to the ground and the sniper slumped
across a branch like a bag of grain.
So far, the operation was going quite
successfully. I had seized the bridgehead and
could now expect to be reinforced by "A"
Company of the Westminster Regiment followed
closely by the remainder of the battalion.
Unfortunately the route taken by the tracked
vehicles proved impractical for the White Scout
Cars of the motor companies. The engineers ·
did not get a route forward as quickly as had
been expected, and it was necessary for the
motor company to feel its way forward over
difficult going in the face of artillery and small
arms fire. It was apparent that I would have to
hold on by myself for some considerable time.
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The original idea had been to get "A" Squadron
across as quickly as possible. About this time,
however, two Panthers and a Self-Propelled
(SP) 88 made their appearance to my left, that
is the east, the closest being about 400 yards
away. They began a slow rate of fire with high
explosive (HE) on the house I was occupying.
Fortunately none of these did any damage, but
the position was definitely becoming very warm.
The tanks and SP tuned the bulk of their
attention to "A" Squadron on the far bank and
started to cause damage in the squadron
headquarters and the two rear troops. It was
apparent that "A" Squadron was suffering
heavily and it was increasingly doubtful whether
they could cross the river. I could see from "A"
Squadron's reply to the fire that they had not
located the source of the trouble, particularly
the SP 88 which was causing particular damage.
I therefore turned over
command to Corporal
McLean and recrossed the
river with the object of
pointing out the target to
"A" Squadron. I stood on
the back of first Captain
Whittle's,
and
later
Lieutenant MacKinnon's
tanks, while they tried to
knock out the target. Either
because they were unable
to identify the target or
because the range was too
long,
they
were
unsuccessful.
I then
returned across the river.

There was a house on our left about 150 or
200 yards away. Spandau fire came from the
house at intervals and about twenty infantry
were observed in the vicinity. I felt certain the
enemy was concentrating in order to wipe out
our small bridgehead and kept up a heavy fire
from small arms, particularly the .50s with the
objective of confusing him as to our strength.
We had the satisfaction of causing him at least
a few casualties, including two hits by .50s. I
would have liked to make use of the PlAT, but
decided to conserve ammunition in case of an

Right: Air Photo of Melfa River, 19 March 1944,
(altitude 25,000').
(LCMSDS Air Photo Collection)
The Melfa River Crossing

It was about this time
Sergeant Macey returned.
He also realized that "A"
Squadron would be unable
to cross, but he had found
my tank which Sergeant
Lofvendah had managed to
repair and brought it over
the river. I did not bring it
up the bank, but placed it
some distance below the
crest as a rallying point in
case we were forced out of
our position. The situation
was now becoming very
difficult.
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attack by the enemy tanks. These were moving
about considerably and from time-to-time were
turning their attention on us. Nearly all oftheir
shots were high and the shells were exploding
about 50 yards behind us, and by great good
fortune caused no casualties. There was no
doubt that if the enemy chose to employ his
tanks and infantry for the purpose, he could
have driven us out of the bridgehead. The
urgent need was for infantry with which we
could expand the bridgehead, get tanks across
and so continue the advance. I reported all of
this to the CO who could do very little for me
except request that the infantry brigade be
pushed forward as quickly as possible. This
was about 1600 hours. The tanks were fighting
hard on the near bank and were unable to give
me much support. The CO gave me permission
to recross the river if necessary. However, as
we had so far succeeded in bluffing the enemy
as to our strength, I decided to hold on- but
the decision was not an easy one.
At about 1700 hours, "A" Company of the
Westminster Regiment under Major Mahony
started to arrive, first one platoon and then the
remainder of the company. The good luck
which we had unfortunately did not extend to
them and they had several casualties including
one man killed within two minutes of reaching
the position. Major Mahony quickly organized
an attack on the house to my left. This was
captured, together with twenty prisoners, at
the cost of some casualties. The SP 88 to my
left was still doing damage and Trooper Funk
volunteered to take it out with a PlAT covered
by two Bren gunners of the Westminster
Regiment. He crept along the bank of the river
until he was about 150 yards from the SPat
which time he fired one round. This exploded
prematurely owing to overhanging foliage.
Trooper Funk then crept forward to a spot from
which he could get a better shot. At a range of
about 100 yards, his next shot was higher and
another low, but the final shot hit the
suspension following which the crew bailed
out. One was shot with the Bren gun and the
remainder were eventually captured. After
this, the two Panthers pulled back to a range of
about 800 yards. Shortly after this, a patrol
which had been pushed out to the right flank,
reported that the enemy was massing on this
flank, which hitherto had been quiet, in
preparation for an attack.

Trooper Jacob Funk

(LdSH(RC) Museum)
Major Mahony asked me ifi could push my
tanks out on the right flank so as to give him
support. I asked if any tanks had been seen on
the right and was told there was one and
possibly more. I pointed out that the fire power
of a cut-down Stuart against a Panther was
inconsiderable and that to expose them to fire
from the tanks would be virtual suicide; while
if we kept them under cover, we might succeed
in bluffing the enemy as to our true strength,
since we might persuade him that we had good
APweapons. It was extremely hard to deny this
request for fire support. On the other hand, I
felt there would be no advantage in attempting
to do the impossible. A few minutes later, one
of the Westminster carriers which had come
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over with Major Mahony, pushed out about
300 yards on his own initiative, apparently
with the objective of securing the infantry's
flank. Before he could see his danger, the
enemy tanks swept in from the left front, cut
him off and surrounded him. A few seconds
later they moved back to their former positions
with the carrier and any remaining members of
its crew in the middle of them.
Shortly before dusk, we were attacked from
the front by three Panthers followed at some
distance by about 100 infantry. The tanks
came in from about 400 yards firing HE as they
came. Most of the fire was high. The aerials
were clipped off two of my tanks, butfortunately,
there were no casualties. We fired everything
we had from .50s to Tommy guns. We also fired
PlATs, although the range was too long, with
the objective of persuading the enemy that we
had anti-tank weapons. This seemed to have
succeeded, as the tanks swerved off at about
175 yards and did not press the attack. A few
minutes later, the tanks again attacked and
again we fired everything we had. I was climbing
into my own tank to fire the . 50 when an HE hit
a few feet away. It knocked down the remaining
aerial and spattered the vicinity with fragments.
One of them scratched me on the cheek, but
did no serious damage, although I was
somewhat dazed from the concussion for several
minutes. Visibility was becoming very limited
and PlAT ammunition was running low.
Fortunately the tanks once again did not press
their attack, and when they withdrew, they did
not again attack, although they remained in
the vicinity about 1000 yards away and were a
source of no little concern to us.
About this time, "C" Company of the
Westminsters got across on our right. This
strengthened the position considerably,
although "B" Company which were crossing
quite a long way to our left were unable to get
over until after dark. We began to dig in, which
we did with considerable enthusiasm as the
enemy started to put over large numbers of
Nebelwerfer bombs. Fortunately most of these
were about 50 yards over, landing in the river
bed where they caused no damage. This fire
kept up for most of the night and our slit
trenches which started out about nine inches
deep,were a good four feet before morning.

Although I had spotted several good artillery
targets, I had so far been unable to get artillery
fire to bear on them. All of our Forward
Observation Officers (FOOs) had either had
their vehicles destroyed or were out of range of
their guns. About this time I made another try
for artillery support. I discovered that one of
our scout cars was parked alongside a FOO
tank. This tank had only one set which was on
the battery frequency, but relaying messages
through the scout car, I was able to talk to the
FOO. The FOO turned out to belong to, of all
things, a Jeep battery, but his guns were in
action. The Jeep battery with its midget 75 mm
guns had seemed rather comic when the
operation was planned, but now the mighty
mediums were silent and the Jeep guns did
Yeoman service. Throughout the night, the
FOO brought fire down on various targets
which I indicated including the enemy tank
harbour, areas in which movement was seen or
heard and probable forming-up places. In all,
the FOO fired about 1000 rounds, I do not
know whether he did much damage. Still it
must have worried the enemy some and the
sound of our own guns was encouragement of
the best kind.
Towards morning, the Nebelwerfer fire
increased and from time-to-time there were
bursts of Spandau fire. Several times the
enemy went to the trouble of smoking our
positions and each time we expected an
immediate attack. Although the attack never
materialized, it was a nerve-wracking business.
The Jeep battery played a part in discouraging
the enemy - or perhaps he was only bluffing.
At about 0500 hours I talked to several of my
men about where the Nebelwefer fire was coming
from and got a fairly good idea of the general
area. In response to my request, the Jeep guns
shelled it and the Nebelwerfers were silent for
nearly an hour. Later when they opened up
again, the Jeep battery was too short of
ammunition to repeat the process, but the
adjutant whose tank, containing the rear link,
was knocked out about half a mile from the
river bank, saw an arty vehicle from 6th
Armoured Division proceeding along the road.
We rushed out on the road and stopped it. It
turned out to contain a FOO from their SP
regiment. Fortunately, this officer's guns were
in action and he was willing to take on any
41
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targets we could locate. I pointed out quite a
number, using map references and corrections
by the cardinal point system. Unfortunately
we did not again succeed in silencing the
Nebelwerfers and they continued to make things
uncomfortable during most of the morning.
The house to my left which the Westminster
Regiment had captured that previous evening,
had to be abandoned during the night as our
numbers were too small to hold it. The enemy
had re-occupied it and was becoming very
troublesome. At first light, the Westminster
Regiment attacked and captured it suffering
some casualties in the process.
An attack had been scheduled for first light
by the Irish Regiment of Canada which was
assembled on the rear bank ready to cross.
This was postponed until 0930 hours and later
until 1130 hours due to the difficulty of teeing
up supporting fire. At about 0600 hours, the

CO ordered me to return to the rear bank. The
situation was still not too secure and the heavy
weapons of the recce troop made it of greater
value than its numbers would indicate. I
therefore requested permission to remain until
the infantry attack was completed. This was
granted. As the infantry attack went in, we
fired our remaining ammunition to support it
and at about 1215 hours we returned to the far
bank after an extremely eventful 24 hours.

E.J. Perkins served with the Lord
Strathcona's Horse (Royal Canadians)
in the Second World War. He won one of
the few Distinguished Service Orders
awarded to Lieutenants for his actions
at the Melfa River.
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